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Revised abstract 
Brain injuries and brain illnesses provide a very important empirical 
foundation for the construction of neural network models of brain 
functioning. If one wants to base such models on neuropsychological or 
neuropsychiatric data, it is of course essential that the clinical syndromes 
are described properly. A truly astonishing wealth of relevant observations 
has accumulated during the last decades. However, it can be argued that 
the basic understanding of these syndromes by the present generation of 
psychiatrists and neuropsychologists still suffers from the radical break 
with traditional European psychiatry which occurred when the new 
American diagnostic and classificatory system for psychiatry (DSM-III, 
DSM-IV) was launched and accepted as the new basis for psychiatric 
thinking. Especially when it comes to modelling brain systems of memory 
and emotion, the neural network research community should benefit from 
a review of some facts which were lost in that transition. In the present 
paper, which is based on a comprehensive update of the classical European 
diagnostic systems that I participated in some years ago, I focus on three 
such less well-known facts pertaining to memory and emotion: 
 
 The classical so-called “frontal lobe syndrome” is not seldom caused 
by extra-frontal pathology. This fact, which has been known since 
the 1920’s, clearly motivates a conceptual change. Emotional-
Motivational Blunting Disorder (or EMD for short) is a construct 
designed to fulfil this purpose. The DSM alternatives are deficient in 
that they do not respect next point. 
 
 It is extremely important to distinguish the emotional flattening seen 
in EMD from the emotional lability which is a common effect of 
many different brain pathologies. Many taxonomies create confusion 
on this point. Emotional lability is a component of what we call 
Astheno-Emotional Disorder, or AED for short. Mental fatiguability 
and memory disturbances (mainly due to concentration difficulties) 
are other core symptoms of AED. 
 
 The use of the seemingly general term “Amnes(t)ic Syndrome” to 
designate an – albeit very important – subgroup of memory deficits is 
misleading, considering that AED is the most common cause of 
memory disturbances in organic psychiatry. It is suggested that one 
instead use Korsakoff’s Amnestic Disorder, or KAD for short. 
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Background 
 In the early 1970’s, the author entered an interdisciplinary cooperation 
with a leading European specialist in organic psychiatry, Göran Lindqvist. 
A specialist in both internal medicine and psychiatry, working first in 
departments of geriatrics, internal medicine and endocrinology, and then 
for two decades as a consultant psychiatrist in a neurosurgical university 
clinic, GL amassed an almost unique experience in the organic psychiatric 
field. Among other things, he was the first to report the occurrence of the 
Korsakoff’s amnestic syndrome after rupture of an aneurysm on the 
anterior communicating artery.1  
 
 The present author’s had had some psychiatric experience already in 
the 1970’s, but his main contribution to the cooperation was his expertise 
in philosophical issues concerning classification, scientific explanation and 
the body-mind problem. Together, GL and HM published a comprehensive 
treatise on organic psychiatry in 1990 – regrettably, only in Swedish!2 An 
English summary of it was published in 1993, but the international impact 
of the book has of course been negligible.3  
 
 The classificatory system in the book (below: the LM system) has its 
roots in classical European psychiatry: Eugen Bleuler, Manfred Bleuler, 
Karl Jaspers, Claus Conrad and many others. It is opposed to DSM-III/IV 
in that it is not a-theoretical.4 I.e., the disorders are not defined strictly in 
terms of observable symptoms and signs. The LM system is however not 
etiologically based either. Indeed, one of the main points made in the book 
is that the same disorder can be caused by many different etiological 
agents – as a rule even by differently located brain injuries. Instead, the 
basic categories are thought of as hypothetical psychopathogenetic 
processes. These processes typically have certain observable 
manifestations, by means of which they can be empirically specified. 
However, through clinical and theoretical considerations the underlying 
processes can also be identified in non-typical cases where the usual 
empirical criteria are not fulfilled. Among these cases are, importantly, 
those where the disorder-process in question interacts with other, co-
occurring disorders. Multiple diagnoses are thus possible, and indeed they 
should be the rule rather than the exception. 
 
These principles will now be illustrated through three case histories 
(abbreviated and translated from Lindqvist & Malmgren 1990). 
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Case 1 
 At the age of 50, this female patient noted a progressively raised 
mental fatiguability, irritability and emotional lability. External signs of 
acromegaly were noted at the age of 54, and with time she developed 
diabetes and heart insufficiency. At 64, the symptoms became much 
worse, and the patient complained of headache and severe fatigue. X-ray 
therapy directed towards the hypophysis had no certain effect and a trans-
sphenoidal hypophysectomy was therefore performed when the patient 
was 66. Her endocrinological status after the operation was satisfactory 
and overall she improved somatically, but three years later she died from 
cerebrovascular causes.  
 
 At the preoperative psychiatric assessment, the patient was tired and 
emotionally very labile, and she complained about her severe 
forgetfulness, but the contact with the physician was very warm and 
natural. However, a few weeks after the operation – when the acute post-
operative lowering of wakefulness had regressed – it was obvious that her 
personality had changed. She showed very little interest in what happened 
around her. She answered questions very briefly and it was impossible to 
get a good personal contact with her. Her mood was a shallow euphoria 
which however turned into irritation when people asked her difficult 
questions. – A couple of months later, there was some improvement, but 
she was still not interested in upholding a good emotional contact. She also 
seemed to have completely lost her sense of hygiene. – Later on, her 
condition improved gradually, and three years after the operation all the 
mentioned symptoms had disappeared. This was testified by the patient’s 
close relatives and was confirmed by the clinical examination. 
 
 Before the introduction of DSM-III, the post-operative diagnosis for 
this patient’s condition would have been frontal lobe syndrome. However, 
it is quite improbable that her operation should have done any damage to 
frontal structures. Instead, the case illustrates the fact that the so-called 
“frontal lobe syndrome” not seldom has an extra-frontal aetiology. In the 
LM system, the etiologically neutral name Emotional-Motivational 
Blunting Disorder, or EM disorder for short, is therefore used.5 
 
What about this patient’s condition before the operation? Let us have a 
look at another case to illustrate this. 
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Case 2 
 At the age of 37, this male patient started feeling more tired after work 
than usual. After nine months this fatiguability had become worse, and the 
patient also experienced concentration difficulties, forgetfulness and some 
emotional lability. Three months later a meningeoma at the left frontal 
convexity was diagnosed. At the preoperative psychiatric assessment, the 
patient seemed to be intellectually intact. He showed a natural spontaneity 
and initiative and his judgment was not impaired, but it was obvious that 
he easily got tired. This was especially the case when the task demanded 
continuous attention. He also became uncertain when put to memory tasks. 
The results on tests for concentration and memory were very weak, but 
there was no tendency to confabulation on the memory tests. – After the 
operation, the patient’s condition improved rapidly. He got back into work 
already after a couple of months, and then reported that his mental 
condition was the same as before the illness. 
 
 One interesting thing with this case is that although it was obviously 
caused by a frontal tumour, its symptomatology has nothing in common 
with the classical frontal lobe syndrome. There is no loss of initiative, no 
shallow euphoria, no disinhibition. The patient’s judgment and his ability 
for emotional contact are intact. True, there is an emotional lability, but 
this must not be confused with the emotional shallowness of the EM 
disorder. So how should we classify his disorder? In DSM-IV, the label 
Cognitive Disorder Not Otherwise Specified might be used for this 
patient’s condition. However, his emotional lability is not included in that 
concept so one might instead consider Personality Change Due to Brain 
Tumor, Labile Type. But that would not cover his cognitive difficulties.  
 
 In the LM system, there is a concept that includes both the cognitive 
and the emotional symptoms: Astheno-Emotional Disorder, or AE 
disorder (or AED) for short. Looking back to Case 1, it should be obvious 
that the pre-operative psychiatric condition of that patient was very like 
that of the present one, only that the emotional lability was more marked in 
her case. In short, she also had an AED. Indeed, AED is seen with a great 
multitude of etiological factors like head trauma, tumours of any location, 
endocrinological disturbances, infections, and ischemic and degenerative 
brain disease of old age. In the last-mentioned context, AED is better 
known as “Mild Cognitive Impairment”, MCI.6 But why use a specific 
term for each clinical context, when there is one which covers them all?7 
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Case 3 
 This man fell ill at the age of 67 with an attack of temporary loss of 
consciousness. One week later a similar incident occurred again and now a 
left hemiplegia remained. A subarachnoidal bleeding was diagnosed, and 
the patient was operated with ligation of a ruptured aneurysm on the 
anterior communicating artery. This was before the microneurosurgical 
era and the operation was technically difficult, but there were no somatic 
postoperative complications. 
 
 At the psychiatric assessment before the operation the patient was very 
tired and could not uphold his interest for the questions asked. His 
judgment and his ability for abstract thought seemed essentially intact, 
however. His results on memory tests were weak but he did not 
confabulate and he was fully oriented.  
 
 One day after the operation there were several marked changes in his 
mental condition. He was more alert and gave quick and formally adequate 
responses to questions. However, he was deeply disoriented both spatially 
and temporally, and did for example not know how old he was. He could 
not memorize what he was told, but gave some adequate information about 
his earlier life. – Some tens days later he was moved to another room and 
then became irritable and more difficult to handle. At the same time he 
seemed remarkably indifferent and never took an initiative towards 
talking. – Two weeks after the operation, he could adequately report about 
the events before the operation, with the exception of the days immediately 
preceding it. He was still disoriented and did not remember a single one of 
five presented objects after three minutes. He confabulated readily. This 
state prevailed for the remaining three weeks at the hospital. 
 
 After that there was a gradual recovery, but his emotional indifference 
and lack of interest in his close relatives were a concern for some time. 
Two and a half months after the operation, his daughter thought that the 
father was the same as before except perhaps for some remaining 
indifference. At the psychiatric assessment he was quite oriented and his 
judgment seemed to be normal. Although the results on some memory 
tests were as bad as before the operation, other were better and there was 
no confabulation.  
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Amnesia is not one disorder 
 Amnesic (or Amnestic) Disorder (or Syndrome) is a common 
designation for this patient’s condition after the operation. The first point 
to be made from a conceptual point of view is that these names invite a 
confusion between the kind of memory disturbance that prevailed after the 
operation and the memory problems that the patient had immediately 
before. With a high probability, the latter problems were at least partly due 
to a concurrent astheno-emotional (AE) disorder, i.e. they were of the 
same nature as the memory difficulties that we saw in Case 1 and Case 2. 
Since memory difficulties due to AED are more common in clinical 
practice than such due to the so-called Amnestic Syndrome, it is better to 
have a more specific name for the latter. We have therefore suggested the 
use of Korsakoff’s Amnestic Disorder, or KAD for short. Korsakoff 
described all the essential features of the syndrome in the 1880’s, 
including the remarkable fact that implicit learning can be preserved.8 
Historically, the term “Korsakoff’s syndrome” has been associated with a 
specific aetiology of the syndrome (alcoholism), and sometimes with 
symptoms other than the amnestic ones. However, in the absence of clear 
evidence to the contrary one may presume that the amnesia is essentially 
the same in alcoholic cases with dysfunction of the mammillary bodies or 
the medial thalamus as in, for example, bilateral hippocampal damage. 
(How else could Korsakoff’s descriptions fit the famous case of HM so 
well?) That different locations may produce some clinical differences is 
obvious, but this does not entail that we should use different diagnoses. 
 
 The second point to be made from Case 3 is that it reminds us that  
Korsakoff’s amnestic disorder is not seldom transient. The paradigm 
example of this is of course the so-called “Transient Global Amnesia” 
(TGA), which has all the characteristics of KAD.9 We also believe that the 
common “memory gap” that often remains after a head trauma is a 
manifestation of an (otherwise) rapidly transient KAD.  
 
 The third point is the co-existence in this case of three organic mental 
syndromes: Korsakoff’s Amnestic Disorder, Astheno-Emotional Disorder 
and Emotional-Motivational Blunting Disorder. During the acute post-
operative phase, only the KAD and the EMD were visible. However, the 
memory deficits early and late in the course were probably mainly due to 
an AED. It may be presumed that the latter disorder was present even 
when the KAD and the EMD dominated the clinical picture. 
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Dementia and the Dysexecutive Syndrome 
 Dementia is an essentially socio-functional concept that comprises 
many different clinical pictures and many different somatic aetiologies. 
We have found it fruitful to look at the symptomatology of the dementias 
in terms of the three “big” disorders AED, KAD and EMD. Nearly all 
dementia cases can be analyzed as containing more or less of each of these 
three components. The composition often varies over time and at the 
beginning only one of the disorders may be manifest. A dementia from 
cerebrovascular causes usually starts with AED (“MCI”) symptoms and is 
long dominated by more and more severe symptoms of this kind. 
Alzheimer’s disease is more prone to begin with discrete symptoms of 
EMD or even KAD, and even when AED are the first symptoms the other 
two components usually soon make their appearance. This is of course not 
surprising in view of the common location of the Alzheimer disease 
process to temporo-frontal areas. It goes without saying that beside 
manifestations of the three mentioned disorders, most dementia cases also 
show diverse focal neurological symptoms and signs such as aphasia. 
 
 The Dysexecutive Syndrome is a controversial construct which is 
defined differently by different authors. It is however thought by all of its 
proponents to comprise certain disturbances of higher cognitive 
(“executive”) functions and, importantly, to be “frontal” in nature.10 Some 
of the definitions of the concept indeed reminds one of the classical 
“frontal lobe syndrome”, but other definitions hardly mention emotion and 
motivation. In our view, the concept is the result of not realizing that 
frontal damage can give rise to two distinct organic mental disorders: 
astheno-emotional disorder (AED) and emotional-motivational blunting 
disorder (EMD). Of these, AED occurs in a lot of other locations of the 
brain pathology, and even with frontal damage it is more common than 
EMD. EMD, in turn, does not occur only with frontal lesions but also as a 
consequence of pathologies of extra-frontal, limbic structures.11  
 
 A crucial issue in the differentiation of AED and EMD is the 
distinction between emotional lability and emotional (and motivational) 
shallowness. EMD leads to a change in the patient’s personality because 
her basic emotional attitude towards others and her ambitions about her 
own future are affected. In contrast, a patient with AED (only) is the same 
person as before, intellectually as well as motivationally and emotionally, 
but more prone to mental fatigue and emotional over-reactions. 
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Neural networks for organic psychiatry? 
 Much effort is now concentrated on analyzing internal and external 
hippocampal circuits in order to understand the amnestic syndrome on a 
neural network level. There is a popular view to the effect that amnesia = 
hippocampal damage, but most researchers of today surely know that non-
hippocampal lesions, for example in the mammillary bodies or medial 
thalamus, may cause a full-blown Korsakoff’s amnestic disorder (KAD). 
Not so many are aware that most organic memory disturbances are not due 
to KAD. Both facts must be taken account of in the neural network theory. 
 
 Contemporary speculations about the neural networks underlying 
emotion often focus on conditioned fear and its supposed anatomical locus 
in the amygdalae. However, another equally urgent task is to understand 
the brain’s innate motivational and emotional circuits on a detailed 
network level. The clinical evidence – especially, of course the evidence 
pertaining to the emotional-motivational blunting (EM) disorder – shows 
that these circuits include a much wider area, indeed the whole of the 
(fronto-)limbic system. The scientific community’s interest in this system 
has been rather low during the last decades. This is probably partly due to 
the abovementioned misunderstandings about “frontal” symptoms, and 
partly to the way emotional disturbances are categorized in DSM-III/IV. 
 
 Astheno-emotional (AE) disorder poses a great challenge for neural 
network theorists. The way AED manifests itself is a paradigm case of 
graceful degradation: top intellectual and emotional capacity are kept very 
long, but the efficiency of cognitive and emotional processing is gradually 
diminished when the disorder worsens. The fact that the disorder can be 
caused by lesions at almost any location is intriguing. The immediate 
cause of the symptoms could be a structural or functional disturbance of a 
network that is physically distributed over almost the whole brain. A more 
probable explanation, though, is that the underlying network itself is more 
strictly localized but that its proper functioning depends on its receiving 
normal input from a host of other brain areas. Such an hypothesis becomes 
even more probable if one considers that AED affects high-level, non-
domain-specific cognitive functions such as the capacity to uphold 
continuous attention on any current topic. To serve such capacities, the 
network must of course receive convergent input from many domains. 
Being built to coordinate such input, it is no wonder if its performance 
becomes degraded when part of the input falls outside the normal range.      
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